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Abstract
What is the effect of future information on today’s actions? The answer may
help understand, or justify, low investment in the presence of adjustment
costs, a preference for holding liquid money, self-insurance or precautionary
savings motives, environmental preservation and global warming abatement
policies. Within a three-period model, Epstein (1980) showed that the effect
of future information depends on a condition on an indirect value function.
We provide the necessary and sufficient condition on the model’s primitives.
Furthermore, we derive a generic ambiguity result, and characterize all model
specifications for which the question can be answered without ambiguity.
These specifications include all classical models discussed in the literature.
The paper also discusses the interpretation of the concept of flexibility in this
literature.
Introduction
Economic agents often make decisions under uncertainty, anticipating that
future information may reduce uncertainty over time. This paper provides
a systematic analysis of the anticipated effect of future information on to-
day’s decisions. This analysis is relevant to study the option value to wait
for future information,1 but it can virtually apply to all problems in which
decisions are made sequentially. Applications include investment decisions
in the presence of adjustment costs, the decision to preserve or to develop an
environmental area, portfolio composition decisions with costly portfolio re-
balancing, the timing of CO2 emissions or consumption smoothing over time.
Our framework is standard. It is based on a model of learning with a
Bayesian, von Neumann-Morgenstern decision-maker. We consider a three-
period model in which the decision-maker first chooses a; then gets some
information on the unknown state of nature x; and finally chooses b. The
decision-maker has preferences U(x, a, b). Information arrival is modelled
using a Blackwell information structure, whose precision can be varied. The
question is: how does the optimal first-period decision a change when the
information structure is replaced by a more precise one?2
There has been an important literature analyzing the effect of learning
using this framework. The literature begins with Arrow and Fisher (1974)
and Henry (1974) who show that learning always favors more flexible deci-
sions. This classical result is usually coined the ”irreversibility effect”. It is
well-known, however, that Arrow-Fisher-Henry consider a specific problem
1This value is also coined the quasi-option value.
2The literature uses equivalent terms to characterize a more precise information struc-
ture in the sense of Blackwell. These terms include an ealier resolution of uncertainty
(Epstein, 1980), an increase in uncertainty (Jones and Ostroy, 1984), learning (Ulph and
Ulph, 1997), or a better information structure (Gollier, Jullien and Treich, 2000). In this
paper, we will often say that we study the effect of learning, or that of a more precise
information.
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using additive separable preferences of the form U(x, a, b) = u(a, x)+v(b, x).
Epstein (1980) emphasizes this limitation, and considers a general nonsepa-
rable model in which today’s decision a can directly affect the future utility
v(b, x). Epstein derives a condition that permits to sign the effect of the
precision of information in this model. The subsequent literature, including
Demers (1991), Kolstad (1996), Ulph and Ulph (1997), and Gollier, Jullien
and Treich (2000), considers nonseparable models and therefore studies the
Epstein’s condition.3 Jones and Ostroy (1984) extend the Epstein’s condition
to non-differentiable problems.
It must be stressed, however, that the Epstein’s condition bears on the
value function of the second-period problem. More precisely, the condi-
tion depends on the convexity in p of the derivative in a of the function
j(a, p) ≡ maxb
∑
x p(x)U(x, a, b), in which p(x) is the probability of state
x, and p the associated probability distribution. It is recognised that it is
technically difficult to solve the comparative static analysis of learning using
this condition. It is also difficult to connect this condition to the primitives
of the model U . Papers using the Epstein’s condition usually assume simple
functional forms. The analysis of the effect of learning thus does not usu-
ally provide interpretative properties on preferences and technologies, unlike
the literature on the effect of more risk (Rothschild and Stigliz, 1970, Gol-
lier, 2001). Moreover, there are ”ambiguous” results in the literature, in the
sense that an increase in the precision of information may reduce or increase
the first period’s decision depending on precise properties of the function U ,
of prior beliefs, or of the information structures and probability distributions.
This paper first characterizes a condition on U that indicates whether
the problem is ”ambiguous”, that is whether the effect of more precise infor-
mation can always, or can never, be signed. This result therefore identifies
3See also three excellent surveys of the option value literature that base their analysis
on the Epstein’s condition: Graham-Tomasi (1995), Gollier (2001, Chapter 25) and Fisher
and Ma¨ler (2006).
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the exact conditions ensuring that there is a connection possible between the
Epstein’s condition and the primitives of the model. The negative side of
this result is that this condition only holds non-generically in the space of
functions U . The positive side is that the non-generic class of functions U
satisfying our condition is straightforward to characterize. It contains for
example all functions U that are linear in the state of nature x, together
with other, non-linear specifications, as in a global warming model when the
decision-maker is risk-averse with linear tolerance to risk. This condition,
that amounts to characterize a separability property, thus tells us when ex-
isting results in the literature could never be generalized. In particular, we
study when this property is, or is not, satisfied under risk averse preferences.4
Furthermore, when this property is satisfied, and thus when the effect
of learning is non-ambiguous, we derive an additional condition on U that
directly indicates what is the systematic effect of learning. This additional
condition is such that it makes the decision-maker’s payoff more dependent
on the second period decisions. By directly applying this technical condition,
we revisit and/or extend all applications (that we are aware of) that have
been considered so far the literature. For instance, we show that the irre-
versibility effect usually does not hold when adjustment costs are ”smooth”.
We also identify the precise conditions on the utility function and on the
damage function so that learning increase early CO2 emissions within a fairly
standard model of global warming. Also, this condition allows us to discuss
the concept of flexibility, and to provide an interpretation to this concept in
terms of the anticipated cost of ex post mistakes. Finally, we use this condi-
tion to solve new problems, for instance to examine the effect of learning on
the demand of risky assets with adjustment costs.
4It is often recognised that the option value exists even under risk-neutrality. Dixit
(1992, p.110) for instance says that ”the value of waiting has nothing to do with risk-
aversion”. Although this statement is correct, it may lead to believe that risk-aversion
does not affect the option value, and, more generally, does not affect the anticipated effect
of information on early decisions. See, for instance, Kolstad (1996). Our paper strongly
qualifies this belief.
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The plan is the following. Section 1 introduces the model, and the Ep-
stein’s result. Section 2 defines and characterizes a particular class of payoff
functions. Section 3 offers the main result. Section 4 discusses the irre-
versibility effect using simple examples. Section 5 and 6 study more ap-
plications cases found in the literature, and introduce new ones. Section 7
concludes.
1 The Model
We consider a simple three-period model in which a decision-maker first
chooses a; then learns some information y on the unknown state of nature
x ∈ X; and finally chooses b. The decision-maker is a Bayesian expected
utility maximizer, with preferences U(x, a, b) and prior beliefs p. We assume
that b is chosen in Rn (n ≥ 1); that U is strictly concave with respect to
b; that a is chosen in a closed interval of R; that U can be differentiated as
many times as needed with respect to (a, b); that X is finite; and finally that
beliefs p verify p(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.5
For some prior beliefs p on X, the decision-maker’s objective function
when choosing a is
j(a, p) ≡ max
b
∑
x
p(x)U(x, a, b).
Notice that the strict concavity of U ensures the uniqueness of the solution
b(a, p) to this problem. In the following, we shall without loss of generality
restrict attention to the pairs (a, b) such that b = b(a, p) for some p. Notice
also that j is convex in p because it is a maximum of linear functions.
Consider a random variable y˜ whose distribution conditional to x is
5One could additionally restrict beliefs to belong to an open, convex subset of the set of
distributions on X. The conditions derived below remain unchanged. As a consequence,
our results hold also locally, in the neighbourhood of a decision a and for small variations
in beliefs.
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known.6 Given the prior beliefs p, a realization y of y˜ makes the decision-
maker update his prior p into posterior beliefs qy. Then the decision-maker’s
objective function changes from j(a, p) to
Ey max
b
∑
x∈X
qy(x)U(x, a, b) = Eyj(a, qy)
Notice that Bayesian updating requires that p = Eyqy. From the convex-
ity of j it immediately follows that
Eyj(a, qy)− j(a, p) ≥ 0
This difference is the option value associated to a; it is simply the value
of future information, conditional on the first-period decision a.7
Consider now the more general problem in which it is the precision of fu-
ture information which is learnt to be increased. A more precise information
is defined as a random variable y˜′, such that any decision-maker prefers learn-
ing y˜′ to learning y˜. As is well-known, this is equivalent to the requirement
that y˜ can be obtained from y˜′ by using a ’garbling machine’, which adds
a noise uncorrelated with the true state of nature.8 Another useful result
about the comparison of information structures is the following : y˜′ is more
precise than y˜ if and only if, for any prior p, the distribution of posteriors qy′
forms a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of posteriors qy, in the
6y|x then defines an information structure in the sense of Blackwell; assume for sim-
plicity that y takes a finite number of values, and that prob(y|x) is everywhere strictly
positive, so that posterior beliefs qy(x) = prob(x|y) are also everywhere positive.
7This definition may follow from the idea that the option value is a correction term,
allowing to take into account the effects of learning (see Hanemann, 1989).
8One manner to obtain a more precise information is to consider that the decision-
maker faces a given experiment y˜|x, and to reduce his confidence in his prior beliefs.
Then the decision-maker will revise his beliefs differently, by giving more weight to the
new information and less weight to his prior beliefs. Jones and Ostroy (1984) argue that
this leads to a new structure of posteriors corresponding to a more precise information.
Hence switching to a more precise experiment may be interpreted as introducing more
uncertainty in the decision-maker’s prior beliefs.
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space of posteriors (Marschak and Miyazawa, 1968). In other words, one can
find (hypothetical) conditional probabilities prob(y′|y) such that
∀ y qy =
∑
y′
prob(y′|y)qy′ .
Once more, switching from y˜ to y˜′ can only benefit the decision-maker,
whatever his first-period decision a : by convexity of j in p we have
Eyj(a, qy) ≤ Eyprob(y′|y)j(a, qy′) = Ey′j(a, qy′)
The same reasoning can now be applied to check whether the change
from y˜ to y˜′ increases the first-period decision a. Since the optimal decision
obtains by maximizing Eyj(a, qy), this will be the case if
9
Eyja(a, qy) ≤ Ey′ja(a, qy′).
This result forms Epstein condition :
Proposition 1 (Epstein, 1980) An increase in precision of future informa-
tion increases the optimal first period decision if and only if ja(a, p) is convex
in p.
This condition has been applied in the literature to various simple speci-
fications for the function U . Because the condition bears on an indirect value
function and not on U directly, it is not easy to check. The first aim of this
paper is to replace this condition bearing on j by an equivalent condition
bearing on the primitive U .
2 Payoff Functions Admitting an Invariant
The analysis would be easy if the optimal second-period choice b(a, p) did not
depend on a. Notice, however, that one can proceed to a change of variable
on b, without any impact on the choice of a. Hence the definition:
9Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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Definition 1 Let b(a, p) denote the unique solution to
max
b
∑
x
p(x)U(x, a, b)
The payoff function U admits an invariant if and only if there exists a
change of variable B = f(a, b) such that :
i) for any a, b 6= b′ ⇒ f(a, b) 6= f(a, b′)
ii) for any p, f(a, b(a, p)) does not depend on a.
Therefore, if U admits an invariant f , then f−1 exists and one can define
V (x, a,B) = U(x, a, f−1(B, a))
Then the optimal second-period decision for a decision-maker endowed with
preferences V and beliefs p does not depend on a : it is
B(p) ≡ f(a, b(a, p))
Equivalently, we get b(a, p) = f−1(B(p), a), so that b(a, p) depends on p only
through a statistic B(p). Since the change of variable must be one-to-one,
the constraint is that this statistic B(p) must have the same dimension as b.
This class of functions may seem restrictive, but it contains for example
all functions U that are linear in x. Indeed consider
U(x, a, b) = u(a, b) + v(a, b) · x
where · denotes a scalar product. The decision-maker’s choice b(a, p) is char-
acterized by
ub(a, b) + vb(a, b)Epx = 0
so that b(a, p) depends on p only through the statistic Epx. The problem
thus admits the invariant
f(a, b) = −[vb(a, b)]−1ub(a, b)
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which is well-defined because we have assumed U strictly concave. In the
case when both b and x are one-dimensional, this invariant is the marginal
rate of substitution between the risk-free part u and the exposure to risk v;
for given beliefs the decision-maker always make the same trade-off between
these two elements.
Other examples of functions U admitting an invariant are discussed in
the next sections. The following result gives a simple property for these
functions:
Suppose that U admits an invariant. Then for any a and b, there exists
a vector d(a, b) and a matrix M(a, b) such that
∀ x Uab(x, a, b) + Ubb(x, a, b)d(a, b) = M(a, b)Ub(x, a, b) (1)
Moreover, if this property holds, then
∀ a, p d(a, b(a, p)) = ∂b
∂a
(a, p).
The restriction in (1) is that it must be valid for all x ∈ X. On the other
hand, (1) only depends on Ub, so that this property is unaffected if one adds
an arbitrary function w(a, x) to U .
The following Corollary may also be useful when U(x, a, b) is differen-
tiable.
Corollary 1 When b and x are real numbers and U(x, a, b) is differentiable,
(1) is equivalent to
∂
∂x
(
∂
∂a
∂
∂x
logUb
∂
∂b
∂
∂x
logUb
) = 0
In the following sections, we will mostly use (1) which allows for multi-
dimensional b and arbitrary x.
3 Main Result
Our main result is the following :
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Proposition 2 If an increase in precision of future information increases
the optimal first-period decision, then U verifies (1).
Conversely, if U verifies (1), and if moreover the matrix M+db is positive
(resp. negative) semi-definite for any a and b, then an increase in precision
of future information increases (resp. decreases) the optimal first-period de-
cision.
Finally, if b is one-dimensional the condition on the sign of M + db is
also necessary.
The necessity part of the Proposition shows that in general one can only
answer the question of the impact of more information on today’s optimal
policy in non-generic cases; indeed (1) has to be satisfied. The proof shows
that this ambiguity is also local: it still holds in neighborhood of a decision
a, and only small variations of beliefs are allowed.
At this stage, we can offer some intuition on the sufficiency part of Propo-
sition 2. Recall that if U admits an invariant f , and if moreover f verifies
differentiability assumptions, then one can work as well with
V (x, a,B) = U(x, a, f−1(B, a))
and the optimal second-period decision B(p) does not depend on a. Therefore
(1) reduces to
VaB(x, a,B) = M(a,B)VB(x, a,B)
In the case when B is one-dimensional, a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for learning to favour higher decisions a is that the real number M(a, b)
be positive. From the above equality, this means that a higher a increases
the absolute value of VB. Thus the decision-maker’s payoff becomes more
dependent on B, for each state of nature x.
To go further, define the ex-post cost from choosing B as
[max
B′
V (x, a,B′)]− V (x, a,B)
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This term can be interpreted as the ex post cost of a ’mistake’ (as checked
after the realization of x) induced by the choice of B. Our result says that
decisions that are favoured by more learning are those that increase these
costs. Intuitively, a decision-maker who knows he will be better informed
cares less about these mistakes, and can handle relatively more easily an
increase in their costs.
It is useful to relate this intuition to the one given in Jones and Ostroy
(1984) about the concept of flexibility. Jones and Ostroy suggest that a de-
cision is more flexible if it is favoured by the future arrival of a more precise
information. The idea is that tomorrow a better informed decision-maker
will make better choices. Hence the anticipation of more information should
favour decisions which are more ’flexible’, in the intuitive sense of allowing
for a wider range of tomorrow’s decisions at a lower cost. One manner to give
a precise content to this last sentence is thus to characterize decisions which
are favoured by an increase in the precision of future information. This is
what Jones and Ostroy do, and what we do as well. Yet, contrary to the
intuition given by Jones and Ostroy, the formulation above suggests that the
decisions favoured by learning reduce the range of tomorrow’s decisions that
are accessible at a given cost – and thus appear less ’flexible’, and not more.
Finally, we provide a result that complements Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 Assume that b and x are real numbers, that U(x, a, b) is differ-
entiable and that
g(a, b) ≡
∂
∂a
∂
∂x
logUb
∂
∂b
∂
∂x
logUb
is independent from x. An increase in the precision of future information
increases the optimal first-period decision if and only if
1
Ub(x, a, b)
∂
∂b
(Ua(x, a, b)− g(a, b)Ub(x, a, b))
is positive.
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The following sections study the applications found in the literature. In
particular, we show that the class of functions that admit an invariant con-
tains many simple specifications for which it is easy to sign M + db.
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4 The Irreversibility Effect
As we said in introduction, the literature on the irreversibility effect tradi-
tionally considers additive separable preferences of the form11
U(x, a, b) = u(a, x) + v(b, x)
Following Proposition 2, these preferences imply M + db = 0. Learning
thus does not matter because changes in b do not affect the payoffs from a:
Uab = 0 implies that (1) is verified with M = d = 0.
However, in the literature on the irreversibility effect, learning has an
effect because the today’s decision affects the future decision set. Typically,
there is an irreversibility constraint. Consider for example the case when
a firm chooses an investment a, and can adjust it only upward. The irre-
versibility constraint writes
b ≥ a
It is then easily shown12 that in the presence of an irreversibility constraint,
an increase in precision of future information reduces the optimal choice of a.
This classical result always holds precisely because U is additive separable.
10In the following sections, we will present several applications. We will thus need
to introduce several economic models. Nevertheless, we will only present a very brief
introduction to each of these models. Instead, we will focus on the properties of these
models that are important for the analysis of the effect of learning. For a more accurate
presentation of the various models, we recommend to read their initial presentation in the
references that will be systematically given.
11See, e.g., Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Freixas and Laffont (1984), Fisher
and Hanemann (1987) and Hanemann (1989).
12Using Epstein’s condition, one easily find that ja(a, p) =
∑
p(x)ua(a, x) +
min(
∑
p(x)vb(a, x), 0), and is thus concave in p. Similar proofs can be found in Epstein
(1980).
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In this section, we show that this result strongly depends on the modelling
of irreversibility, through a constraint. This constraint implies that there is
an infinite cost to choose b lower than a, and a zero cost otherwise. Suppose
instead that one considers instead ”smooth” adjustment costs c(a, b), where
c is strictly convex in b. We write
U(x, a, b) = u(a, x) + v(b, x)− c(a, b) (2)
and we can apply Propositions 2 and 2. In particular, equation (1) becomes
vbbd−Mvb = dcbb + cab −Mcb
Because the right-hand-side of this equation is independent from x, so
must be the left-hand-side. It is easily checked that the associated restriction
on v is that one can write
vb(b, x) = A(b)K(x) + L(b)
Hence an increase in the precision of information does not necessarily
cause a systematic change in a; to be able conclude one has to impose strong
restrictions on v. After this step, one can directly get the values of M and
d. However, because the expressions are complex, and M + db still has an
ambiguous sign.13
The rest of this section revisits standard examples initially analyzed in
literature on the irreversibility effect, using an irreversibility constraint. We
underline that the systematic effect of learning in favor of flexibility may
disappear once the irreversibility constraint is replaced by smooth adjustment
costs.
13In particular, if A(b) > 0, then M + db is positive if and only if cab/( ∂∂b
L−cb
A ) is
increasing with b. Concavity of U only implies that the denominator is negative, so that
this property is in no way guaranteed.
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4.1 The Arrow-Fisher example
Arrow and Fisher (1974) considers a model similar to the following one. A
forest of unit size whose ecological value x is uncertain. The risk-neutral
decision-maker can cut a share a in the first period, and a share b in the
second period. He or she can sell timber at a price p0 and p1 in each period.
The irreversibility constraint is
0 ≤ b ≤ 1− a
which states that one can neither replant, nor cut more than unit size of the
forest.
We consider a variant version of the Arrow-Fisher example with smooth
adjustment cost. It is based on the following preferences
U(x, a, b) = x(1− a− b) + p0a+ p1b− c(a, b)
Replacing into (1), we get
M(a, b) = 0 d(a, b) = −cab
cbb
(a, b)
so that the effect of learning on a depends on whether d increases with b.
Hence, even in this simple setting the effects of learning depend on third
derivatives of the adjustment costs. One can for instance specify these costs
to set
c(a, b) = C1(b) + C2(1− a− b)
which may be interpreted as a ”smooth” version of the constraint 0 ≤ b ≤
1− a. We then get
d(a, b) =
−1
C ′′1 (b)/C
′′
2 (1− a− b) + 1
which is decreasing with b if both C
′′′
1 and C
′′′
2 are negative.
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4.2 The Jones-Ostroy model for holding money
Jones and Ostroy (1984) give an example which offers a rationale for holding
money. The idea is that an investor first chooses a portfolio a, then observes
some information on future portfolio returns x, and reallocates the initial
portfolio a into portfolio b. What is not invested in the portfolio is interpreted
as holding liquid money.
Our framework may be useful to revisit the Jones and Ostroy (1984)’s
example. Consider
U(x, a, b) = u(a, x) + b · x− c(b− a)
where function c is associated to the transaction cost from switching from a
to b. By setting b′ = b− a, we can rewrite
U˜(x, a, b′) = u(a, x) + a · x+ b′ · x− c(b′)
which is additive separable. Hence learning has absolutely no impact, even
though arbitrary transaction costs are introduced.
In fact, the rationale for holding money originates in another feature: in
the Jones and Ostroy (1984)’s model, financial titles other than money can
only be owned in bounded quantities : bi ∈ [0, 1] for all i > 1 (that is, other
than money). The lower bound corresponds to the absence of short sales;
the upper bound is justified by some indivisibilities. This creates constraints
on b′:
−ai ≤ b′i ≤ 1− ai
so that holding money naturally appears as more profitable. These con-
straints would not play any role in the absence of learning, since then the
investor would choose b = a, or equivalently b′ = 0.14
14One may alternatively consider that these bounds are an extreme form of concavity
of returns: so that we could write U(x, a, b) = u(a, x) + v(b, x)− c(b− a). But we are then
back to the ambiguity underlined when studying (2): to conclude one has to assume that
v is linear in some transform of x.
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4.3 Adjusting the capital stock over time
We consider a three-period version of the model in Demers (1991). A firm
first invests a, then additionally invests b. We write
U(x, a, b) = R(a+ b, x)− wb
where R is the final revenue (a first period revenue R1(a, x) could be included
without change), and w is the investment cost. Clearly we can define the
final capital stock as b′ = a+ b, and get
U˜(x, a, b′) = R(b′, x)− wb′ + wa
The problem is additive separable, so that learning has absolutely no
impact on the choice on a.15 This suggests that the irreversibility constraint
of the form
b′ ≥ a
plays a major role in the Demers (1991)’s study. Replacing this constraint
by a smooth adjustment cost function of the form c(b− a) would lead to the
same type of ambiguity that we discussed before.
5 Impact of Learning under Risk-neutrality
This section focusses on cases in which U is linear in x, and thus avoids
difficulties associated with risk-aversion:
U(x, a, b) = u(a, b) + v(a, b) · x
This model can be interpreted as a choice of risk-exposure v by a risk-
neutral decision-maker. Consistent with what we said above, this model
admits an invariant. Indeed (1) reduces to the system of equations
uab + ubbd = Mub
15This result holds true regardless of the dimensionality of a and b, or whether w is
in fact part of the unknown x. Allowing for capital depreciation between period 1 and 2
would not change the result either.
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vab + vbbd = Mvb
which permits to find d and M , and so to be conclusive about the effect of
learning. This is illustrated by the following examples.
5.1 Production choices
We consider a model similar to that of Epstein (1980, section 7). A firm
chooses initially a capital stock a. Then the firm observes the output price
x, and chooses another input b (labour), so that its production is F (a, b),
where F is a concave production function. The idea is that labour can be
adjusted in the short-term, while capital is given. Profits are
U(x, a, b) = xF (a, b)− wb
where w is the input price.
We would like to know whether the fact that x will be learnt in the future
modifies the choice of a. Solving (1) yields the system of equations
Fab + Fbbd = MFb
0 = Mw
so that we get
M = 0 d = −F−1bb Fab
According to Proposition 2 the impact of learning on a depends on
whether d is increasing or decreasing with b. Such a property may or may
not be verified, depending on the third derivative in the production function,
as first acknowledged by Epstein (1980).
Nevertheless, we fully characterize here this critical property, and thus we
can directly conclude for some standard production functions. For instance,
with a Cobb-Douglas production function F (a, b) = Aarbs, we have d =
br(a(1−s))−1 which is increasing in b under r and s in [0, 1]. With a constant
elasticity of substitution production function F (a, b) = A(ras + (1− r)bs)1/s,
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we have d = b(a)−1 which is also increasing in b. Thus learning increases
capital stock for these two standard production functions.
5.2 Self-protection
We consider a model in which capital b can be protected by an investment
a which costs c(a). We assume that capital b can be adjusted after having
obtained some information on the probability of accident x. We write
U(x, a, b) = v(b)− c(a)− b(1− a)x
in which v(b) could be interpreted as the profitability that is derived from
capital b in the economy. This model is similar to that of Kousky, Luttmer
and Zeckhauser (2007), although that they do not study the effect of learning
on self-protection in their paper.
Thus (1) writes
x+ v′′(b)d = M(v′(b)− (1− a)x)
whose solution is
M = − 1
1− a d =
1
1− aT (b)
where T = −v′/v′′ is a measure of the non-linearity of the profitability func-
tion. Hence the effect of learning on the level self-protection a depends on
the sign of T ′(b)−1. Notice that this quantity is exactly zero for v(b) = log b.
5.3 Global warming and emissions
Ulph and Ulph (1997) analyze the effect of learning on the optimal climate
policy.16 They use a microeconomic stock pollutant model:
U(x, a, b) = F (a) +G(b)− xD(a+ b)
16See also Kolstad (1996).
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where the concave functions F and G denote respectively the first- and
second-period utility derived from emissions of pollution a and b, and where
the convex damage function D(a+ b) is affected by the multiplicative shock
x, and depends on the stock of pollution a + b.17 Ulph and Ulph (1997)
indicate that with quadratic functions for F,G and D, learning increases the
first-period emissions a.
According to Proposition 2, we get that the effect in fact depends on the
sign of
[2
−G′′
G′
− G
′′′
−G′′ ] + [2
D′′
D′
− D
′′′
D′′
]
In each bracket the first term is positive, so that we can confirm the Ulph
and Ulph (1997)’s result for quadratic functions. But the two other terms
may modify this result. For example this expression is zero (resp. negative)
with well-chosen logarithmic (resp. square root) G and D functions.
6 Impact of Learning under Risk-aversion
We now examine some situations involving a risk-averse decision-maker.
These problems are not linear in x anymore, and can only be solved for some
specific von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. In the global warming
example, the problem can be solved only if risk tolerance is linear. In the
cake-eating problem prudence must be constant. This observation may ex-
plain, in part, why economists have not studied the relationship between the
option value and risk-aversion.
6.1 Global warming and emissions (continued)
In Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000), a and b are first- and second-period
emissions, and x is the unknown unit damage. The payoff function may be
written
U(x, a, b) = u(a) + v(b− x(a+ b))
17Introducing a decay factor would not change the results.
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Replacing into (1) yields
−x(1− x)v′′2dv′′ = M(1− x)v′
which does not depend on u. Define the tolerance to risk T = −v′/v′′, and
divide by (1− x)v′′ to get
−x+ (1− x)d = −MT
The left-hand-side of this equation is linear in x, and so must be the
right-hand-side. This implies that T must be linear, a particular restriction
on the tolerance to risk of v. Such functions are said to display an hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion; classical examples are the quadratic, exponential, log-
arithmic, and power utility functions. This result corresponds to Proposition
2 in Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000).
So let us set
T (R) = α + γR
Replacing in the above equality at R = b − (a + b)x, one gets a system of
two equations
d+M(α + γb) = 0
1 + d+ γM(a+ b) = 0
whose solution is
M =
1
α− γa d = −
α + γb
α− γa
Finally
M + db =
1− γ
α− γa
Since T (a) = α−γa is a risk-tolerance and is thus positive, we get that an
increase in the precision of information increases optimal emissions today if
γ < 1. This result corresponds to Proposition 1 in Gollier, Jullien and Treich
(2000). This result can be shown to extend to the case of multi-dimensional
b.
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6.2 Eating a cake with unknown size
Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich (2005) consider a standard cake-eating model
in which the cake has an unknown size. They study the effect of learning
about the size of the cake on the initial consumption. The model writes
U(x, a, b) = u(a) + v(b) + w(x− a− b)
Therefore, (1) becomes
w′′ + (v′′ + w′′)d = M(w′ − v′)
so that the only part that depends on x is dw′′−Mw′, and setting M = d = 0
yields a contradiction. Therefore one must have
Pw = −w′′′/w′′ = M
d
in which Pw is the absolute prudence associated to the function w. We now
know that it is a constant, and cannot depend on the last period consump-
tion. This gives us an expression for w, that we can use to solve completely
the problem. The formulae that we obtain are omitted here. We mention
that when w has a constant absolute risk aversion, then the impact of more
information depends on the sign of
Pw[2Av(b)− P v(b) + Pw]
where Av = −v′′/v′ is the absolute risk-aversion of v, and P v is its absolute
prudence. When w is quadratic, the effect depends only on whether v displays
prudence or not.
These results suggest that the effect of learning is usually ambiguous in
the cake-eating problem, unless the utility functions are quadratic or ex-
ponential. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich (2005), in contrast, obtain some
general results because they compare two extreme cases, that is, no learning
and perfect learning.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has studied the classical question of the effect of learning in a
three-period model. It has provided a theorem that characterizes the class
of models for which this question can be answered without ambiguity, and
another that permits to check the sign of this impact.
Several of our results indicate that ambiguity is the rule. This is the case
for generic choices of the payoff function. This is also the case in simple
additive problems, when an irreversibility constraint is replaced by smooth
adjustment costs. Hence the well-known irreversibility effect is not robust
to such changes, apart in the most simple case. Even in problems that
are non-ambiguous, the sign of the impact depends on precise properties
of the payoff function that are not easy to sign. A consequence is that
in simulation exercises one should be cautious when choosing a particular
parametric specification for these functions. Another consequence is that
risk-aversion is shown to be instrumental for the analysis of the effect of
learning.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 : notice first that b(a, p) is characterized by∑
x
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, p)) = 0
so that we can write for any a, b, p∑
x
p(x)Ub(x, a, b) = 0⇒
∑
x
p(x)[Uab(x, a, b) +Ubb(x, a, b)
∂b
∂a
(a, p)] = 0 (3)
If the problem admits an invariant f , then for any a and p we have
B(p) = f(a, b(a, p))
Suppose that for some a, p, q we have b(a, p) = b(a, q). ThenB(p) = B(q),
so that for any a′ one has f(a′, b(a′, p)) = f(a′, b(a′, q)). Because f is one-to-
one, we obtain that b(a′, p) = b(a′, q) for any a′.
Hence we have shown
b(a, p) = b(a, q)⇒ ∂b
∂a
(a, p) =
∂b
∂a
(a, q) (4)
Therefore ∂b
∂a
(a, p) can depend on b only through b(a, p). There thus exists
d such that
∀ a, p d(a, b(a, p)) = ∂b
∂a
(a, p)
Replacing in (3) we get, for any a, b, p∑
x
p(x)Ub(x, a, b) = 0⇒
∑
x
p(x)[Uab(x, a, b) + Ubb(x, a, b)d(a, b)] = 0 (5)
This implies that there exists a matrix M(a, b) such that (1) holds.18
18There is a slight complication here, as p is not any vector of RX : all its components
must be strictly positive, and they must sum to one. Since we have restricted attention
to pairs (a, b) such that b = b(a, p) for some p, these restrictions turn out to not matter
at all. Proof omitted for brievity.
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Conversely, if (1) holds, then summing over x at b = b(a, p) yields∑
x
p(x)(Uab + Ubbd) =
∑
x
p(x)MUb = M
∑
x
p(x)Ub = 0.
We thus have shown (5). Because by strict concavity of U the hessian
matrix
H(a, p) ≡
∑
x
p(x)Ubb(x, a, b(a, p))) (6)
is negative definite, comparing (3) and (5) we get the second statement
in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2 : For given beliefs p and q, and r ∈ [0, 1], define
J(a, r) = j(a, (1− r)p+ rq)
Notice that Epstein’s condition is equivalent to Ja being convex in r.
Suppose this is the case. Compute
Jrr(a, r) = [
∑
(q(x)− p(x))Ub(x, a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq))]. ∂
∂r
b(a, (1− r)p+ rq)
From the first-order condition∑
x
[(1− r)p(x) + rq(x)]Ub(x, a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq)) = 0 (7)
we get the following two expressions
∂
∂r
b(a, (1−r)p+rq) = −H−1(a, (1−r)p+rq)
∑
(q(x)−p(x))Ub(x, a, b(a, (1−r)p+rq)).
(8)∑
(q(x)−p(x))Ub(x, a, b(a, (1−r)p+rq)) = −1
r
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, (1−r)p+rq))
where the hessian matrix H is defined as in (6). Replacing yields
Jrr(a, r) = − 1
r2
[
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq))]′[H(a, (1− r)p+ rq)]−1
[
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq))].
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where the prime stands for transposition. This expression must be increasing
with a, for any p, q, r. This implies that
Z(a, p, q) ≡ [
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, q))]
′[H(a, q)]−1[
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, q))]
is decreasing with a, for any p and q.
Suppose that b(a, p) = b(a, q) at some (a, p, q). Then not only Z(a, p, q) =
0, but also Za(a, p, q) = 0 because all terms in the derivative vanish. Since Z
is decreasing in a and Za = 0, Za attains a maximum at a and thus Zaa = 0.
Computing this second derivative, all terms but one vanish, so that
[
∂
∂a
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, q))]
′[H(a, q)]−1[
∂
∂a
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, q))] = 0
Since the hessian matrix is negative definite, this implies that
∂
∂a
∑
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, q)) = 0
We have thus shown (4), which from the preceeding proof is sufficient for
proving (1). This concludes the proof of necessity.
Conversely, suppose that U verifies (1), and compute
Jar(a, r) =
∑
[q(x)− p(x)][Ua(x, a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq))
+Ub(x, a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq))d(a, b(a, (1− r)p+ rq))]
which depends on r only through b(a, (1− r)p+ rq). Differentiating we get
Jarr(a, r) =
∑
(q(x)− p(x))[Uab + Ubbd+ dbUb]. ∂
∂r
b(a, (1− r)p+ rq)
and using (1) we obtain
Jarr(a, r) = [
∑
(q(x)− p(x))Ub]′[M + db]′ ∂
∂r
b(a, (1− r)p+ rq).
where the prime stands for transposition. Using (8) we get
Jarr(a, r) = −[
∑
(q(x)− p(x))Ub]′[M + db]′H−1[
∑
(q(x)− p(x))Ub].
This shows the result, from the fact that the hessian matrix H is definite
negative.
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